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Under federal law, employers are generally allowed to
set policies regulating employees’ appearance, pro-
vided that those policies do not impinge on groups
specifically protected under federal statute. State and
local laws, however, may preclude employers from
implementing such dress and appearance policies.
Employers whose workers are unionized must con-
sider the provisions of the bargaining agreement. One
trend in connection with regulations relating to employ-
ees’ appearance and dress is that creative lawyers
have stretched the law to cover certain workers.
Keywords: dress codes; discrimination; appear-
ance policies; stereotypes; religion; age;
disability
At the beginning of its 2005-2006 season, theNational Basketball Association (NBA) madeheadline news when it announced that it had
decided to impose an off-the-court dress code on its
players.1 Along that line, USA Today reports that the
number of employers allowing employees to dress
casually is on the decline and that even “business
casual” dress codes are requiring increasingly formal
attire.2 As the managing partner of one business summed
up, “We want our image to go along with our brand-
ing. It supports how we set ourselves forth in the
community.”3
Wanting to present a certain image is an integral
part of doing business, but it can present practical and
CQ294541.qxd  10/3/2006  12:32 PM  Page 359
 360 Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration Quarterly NOVEMBER 2006
CHR LEGAL ROUNDTABLE YOU (DON’T) LOOK MARVELOUS
legal problems. Dress and appearance codes
can lead to union grievances and unfair labor
practice charges before the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), costly lawsuits,
and negative publicity. In 2003, for instance,
Abercrombie and Fitch paid out $2.2 million
dollars to settle claims based upon its
“Appearance/Look Policy,”4 and the com-
pany then paid $50 million to settle three
class actions in which the plaintiffs claimed
that the company’s appearance-based hiring
practices discriminated against women and
minorities.5 Shortly after that, the Borgata
Hotel Casino & Spa in Atlantic City, New
Jersey, came under fire for its employee
weight policy, which penalizes employees
who experience more than a 7 percent
increase in their weight after their hire date.6
The policy spawned a union grievance, a dis-
crimination lawsuit, and a spate of negative
press.7 Indeed, the NLRB has held that
implementation or alteration of a dress code
by an employer is a “mandatory subject of
bargaining” where a company is a party to a
collective bargaining agreement.8 As such, if
an employer alters its dress code without
consulting the union—unless the employer
has explicitly reserved the right to do so in
the collective bargaining agreement—the
company may find itself facing an unfair
labor practice charge before the NLRB.
Whether your business is a professional
sports league, manufacturer, hotel, restau-
rant, casino, or retail chain, there are cer-
tain key legal issues that may be raised by
your company’s dress and appearance code,
as well as your employee-behavior code.
As we discuss in this article, awareness of
these issues may help reduce your com-
pany’s exposure to grievances, NLRB
charges, lawsuits, and bad press.
Are Dress Codes and
Appearance Policies Unlawful?
The proliferation of discrimination law-
suits and the often inaccurate depiction of
employment discrimination in popular
culture9 has led many to believe that
employers cannot base employment deci-
sions on anything other than “legitimate
business reasons.” The implication is that
it is unlawful to “discriminate” against
employees because of almost anything—
including appearance, weight, taste in
clothes and music, and sexual orientation.
Under this type of analysis, one could
argue that a dress code could unlawfully
discriminate against those with long hair,
body piercings, and overwhelmingly bare
midriffs. This is not the case, however,
because federal law prohibits discrimina-
tion based only on the following specific
factors: sex, race, color, national origin,
religion, age, and disability. This means
that under federal law employers can law-
fully discriminate against people whom
the employer believes to be homosexual,
ugly, or have bad taste in clothes and
music. Having said that, it is true, of
course, that states, counties, cities, and
other municipalities may protect other
characteristics,10 but federal discrimina-
tion law is limited to the seven character-
istics that we enumerated.
If the matter were that simple, our arti-
cle would be concluded at this point. That
is, if federal law is so limited and if
employers are free to discriminate against
those who, for example, are unattractive or
dress poorly, the obvious question is why
employers have settled cases for millions
of dollars when they can lawfully discrim-
inate against people who are not specifi-
cally protected under federal law. The
answer is that forty years of creative
lawyering and judicial opinions have
established methods for plaintiffs to “fit”
their claims into one of the seven protected
classes. For example, while being over-
weight is not protected, some courts have
held that obesity is a disability and others
argue that weight-related clauses are a
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Thus, such employees may be protected.
With regard to appearance policies, plain-
tiffs have a number of different theories
they can use to recast their claims as dis-
crimination due to sex, age, religion, or
disability. To understand how plaintiffs do
this, it is necessary to examine Hopkins v.
Price Waterhouse, the case that is most
likely the most famous and often cited
example of a plaintiff expanding a pro-
tected class either, depending on one’s
point of view, (1) to its logical extension or
(2) beyond what Congress most likely
contemplated. This case involves gender
stereotyping.
The Supreme Court Rules
Gender Stereotyping Illegal
Gender stereotyping is the first important
area for employers to consider when con-
sidering dress or behavior codes because it
can lead to a sexual-discrimination case.
The foundation of modern American gender
stereotyping law is the case of Hopkins v.
Price Waterhouse.11 The plaintiff, Ann
Hopkins, was a female associate who was
refused admission to the accounting firm’s
partnership. Her primary claim was gender
discrimination under Title VII. Price
Waterhouse argued that negative remarks
from evaluating partners regarding
Hopkins’s interpersonal skills and reputa-
tion among her colleagues formed a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory rationale for not
making her a partner. Hopkins alleged that
the decision to place her partnership candi-
dacy “on hold” was based on impermissible
gender-based stereotypes and standards, and
as evidence she pointed to performance
evaluations containing remarks that she was
too “macho,” that she “overcompensated for
being a woman,” and that she needed “a
course at charm school.”12 One reviewer
recommended that, to improve her chances
of making partner, Hopkins ought to “walk
more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely, wear make-up, have
her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”13
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan
found that Hopkins had provided suffi-
cient evidence that she had experienced
illegal gender stereotyping, in that she had
been denied a promotion because of per-
sonality traits, behavior, and appearance
that were tolerated by the employer among
its male employees but not among females.
Justice Brennan concluded,
We are beyond the day when an
employer could evaluate employees by
assuming or insisting that they
matched the stereotype associated
with their group, for in forbidding
employers to discriminate against
individuals because of their sex,
Congress intended to strike at the
entire spectrum of disparate treatment
of men and women [italics added]
resulting from sex stereotypes.14
Accordingly, Price Waterhouse stands
for the proposition that men and women
may not be held to different behavioral
standards in the workplace. Thus, a dress
code that required woman to dress profes-
sionally (because appearance is important
for women) but allowed men to dress like
college students (because it really does not
matter how guys look) would be unlawful.
This does not mean, however, that dress
codes cannot be different for men and
women. Indeed, Price Waterhouse is often
cited as a standard that is not used when
analyzing appearance polices.
Dress and Appearance Codes
after Price Waterhouse
The courts have been reluctant to expand
the Price Waterhouse gender-stereotyping
rule to dress and appearance codes, even
where such codes place different require-
ments on men and women. Instead, the
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courts have developed an “undue burden”
test, under which dress codes that place
different requirements on the genders will
pass muster as long as the differences do
not unduly place a greater burden on one
gender.
The “undue burden” test was established
by Frank v. United Airlines,15 in which a
class of female flight attendants chal-
lenged their employer’s weight-restriction
standards that required female employees
to maintain a weight corresponding to
medium-build bodies, while holding male
employees to a large-build weight stan-
dard. United Airlines argued that weight
was a nondiscriminatory appearance stan-
dard. The Ninth Circuit disagreed. Instead
of couching its holding in the gender-
stereotyping language of Price Waterhouse,
however, the court held that the applica-
tion of a different weight standard to men
and women was discriminatory because it
imposed “unequal burdens on men and
women.”16 The court went on to note that
the policy could be justified only if the
employer could demonstrate that the dif-
ferential policy was a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification (BFOQ). Under the
holding in Frank, any weight standard’s
differentiation between the sexes must be
reasonably necessary to the normal opera-
tion of the business and must concern job-
related skills and aptitudes.17 Because the
airline did not demonstrate that the weight
standard was a BFOQ, the female flight
attendants proved that the airline had vio-
lated Title VII.
A Unified Theory of Dress and
Appearance Codes: Jespersen v.
Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc.
In a decision issued just before this
journal went to press, Jespersen v.
Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., the Ninth
Circuit held, in an en banc opinion, that an
employee challenging an employer’s dress
code can do so on either Price Waterhouse
Issues Surrounding a Model Appearance Policy
It is impossible to outline a model dress or appearance policy because no policy has survived judicial
scrutiny with regard to each of the relevant protected classes. Instead, the best we can provide is a check-
list for employers to consider. Even with the following checklist, employers should check with counsel
before implementing a policy.
Sex: Does this policy create a burden for one gender, but not the other?
Age: Is complying with this policy differentially difficult for workers older than forty?
Race and national origin: Does this policy infringe on a cultural aspect of specific race or national origin?
Americans with Disabilities Act: Does any covered disability prevent an employee from complying with this
policy?
An affirmative answer to any of these questions may not doom the policy. It should, however, cause the
company to review the policy to ensure that it is necessary to the business. In addition, as part of any
new policy, employers should let employees know that they should contact the employer and explain,
in writing, any reasons that prevent compliance with the policy. This written explanation should be for-
warded to counsel for advice. Such a written statement establishes the employee’s argument and fore-
stalls further arguments should a creative lawyer become involved.
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gender-stereotyping grounds, Frank v.
United Airlines undue-burden grounds, or
both.18 In that case, Harrah’s “Personal
Best Policy” required female bartenders
and beverage servers to wear makeup
(face powder, blush, and mascara) and lip
color while on the job. The policy also
required female servers to wear nail polish.
As for male beverage servers, the policy
required men to keep their hair neat (no
longer than collar-length) and required
them to keep their hands and fingernails
clean and nails neatly trimmed at all times.
The policy also forbade male bartenders
and beverage servers from wearing nail
polish and makeup.
Jespersen, who claimed she never wore
makeup off the job, objected to the makeup
requirement because, she said, it would con-
flict with her self-image. Jespersen testified
that the requirement to wear makeup upset
her so much that she subjectively felt it
would interfere with her ability to perform
as a bartender. Because she was not quali-
fied for any open positions at the casino
not covered by the policy and with a simi-
lar compensation scale, Jespersen, whom
the court described as an exemplary,
twenty-year employee, was terminated in
2000, when Harrah’s enforced its policy.
After exhausting her administrative reme-
dies, she sued.
In finding for the employer, the Ninth
Circuit held that Jespersen failed to show
that women bore an unequal burden, in
cost and time, in complying with Harrah’s
Personal Best Policy. The court declined
Jespersen’s request to take judicial notice
that it takes more time and money for a
woman to comply with the makeup policy
Considerations for Bargaining Units
Most union contracts allow employers to establish and implement “reasonable” work rules. The term
reasonable means that the right is not absolute and that any proposed rules will be subject to the griev-
ance procedure and, ultimately, arbitration. Dress codes will almost undoubtedly fall into this category.
On the other hand, appearance codes are a mandatory subject of bargaining. An employer who could
not get a union to agree to an appearance policy during negotiations would likely find an arbitrator hos-
tile to single-handed implementation of such a policy, and the employer may be found guilty of an unfair
labor practice by the National Labor Relations Board.
Although arbitration decisions draw on precedent, a decision from a case involving a different
employer has no binding effect. Because arbitrators refer to earlier decisions, though, it is useful to see
how other such cases have been decided. When arbitrators examine the reasonableness of a dress code,
they usually balance the image, safety, and health concerns of the employer against the rights of
employees (under the contract) to determine their own clothing and hair style. In balancing these com-
peting concerns, arbitrators typically look to the employees’ role in the company. For example, arbitra-
tors will almost always allow employers to implement appearance policies for those employees who
come into contact with the public. Arbitrators, however, seem to have different standards for front-of-
the-house and back-of-the-house employees. While arbitrators will uphold standards of cleanliness and
neatness for all employees, they may not uphold specific standards of hair length or clothing style for
those who do not interact with the public.
Unionized employers seeking to implement an appearance policy during the life of a collective bar-
gaining agreement should first determine whether the subject was addressed in negotiations. If not pro-
hibited by the contract (or the failure to agree on such a policy), the employer should develop a rationale
and make sure that the policy supports the company’s image in its interactions with the public.
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than for men to keep their hair neat and
otherwise comply with the requirements
of the policy. Absent proof of an unequal
burden imposed by the policy on women,
the court refused to find the Personal Best
Policy discriminatory.
The Ninth Circuit then turned to the
question of gender stereotyping. The en
banc panel noted that, unlike the gender-
biased criticism aimed at the sole plaintiff
in Price Waterhouse, Harrah’s Personal
Best Policy applied to all beverage servers
and did not single out Jespersen. The pur-
pose of the policy was to ensure that
Harrah’s male and female beverage ser-
vice employees alike present a neat and
attractive appearance to customers. Because
there was no evidence that the purpose of
the policy was to make women beverage
servers conform to a stereotypical image
of what women should wear, and because
there was no evidence that the policy
would objectively inhibit a woman’s abil-
ity to do the job, the court held that one
employee’s personal objection to wearing
makeup could not serve as the basis for
finding the policy to be discriminatory.
The Jespersen opinion signals a new
trend: both the gender-stereotyping test
and the undue-burdens test likely will be
used by courts to examine employers’ dress
and appearance codes. For example, in a
case before the federal district court of New
Jersey, a male food server at a Harrah’s
Entertainment property, who had worn a
ponytail for many years while working for
Harrah’s, was required to cut off his pony-
tail pursuant to a new grooming policy.19
The employee brought suit under Title VII,
claiming that the policy was discrimina-
tory because it allowed female employees
the option of wearing their hair long while
requiring male employees to keep their
hair to a certain length. Even though such
a policy might seem to invoke gender
stereotypes, the district court found that
the policy was not on its face discriminatory
because unlike race or sex, the court held,
hairstyle is not an “immutable characteris-
tic” (which Congress sought to protect in
passing Title VII), a fact demonstrated by
the plaintiff’s cutting off his ponytail and
thereby keeping his job.20 The court went on
to find the employer’s policy to be permissi-
ble because it was evenhanded. Although it
contained different hairstyle requirements
for men and women, it required both male
and female employees to keep their hair
clean and neat, prohibited both male and
female employees from any “extreme styles,
colors, or shaved designs,” and forbade both
male and female employees from wearing
mustaches, beards, or other facial hair.
In Sturchio v. Ridge, the plaintiff was a
male U.S. Border Patrol employee who, as
part of considering and preparing for gen-
der reassignment surgery, began living
(and therefore working) as a woman. The
employee sued the United States, claiming
discrimination in part because Border
Patrol management would not allow him
to wear a dress to work.21 In dismissing the
discrimination claim, the federal district
court of Eastern Washington held that the
Border Patrol’s ban on men wearing
dresses to work “did not impose a greater
burden on one sex than the other,” and
therefore was not discriminatory.22
The dress-code and appearance-code
cases appear to be well grounded. Common
sense argues against applying identical
dress and appearance rules to both genders.
In the end, such an approach would likely
require all employees to wear exactly the
same clothes and sport exactly the same
hairstyle at work. Federal and state dis-
crimination statutes clearly would not appear
to support any such conclusion. Further, the
“common sense” approach by courts to these
cases clearly seems receptive to reasonable
dress and appearance codes mandated by
employers.
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Religious Discrimination
Not only must employers be aware of
possible gender-discrimination claims that
may arise from dress and appearance
codes, but they must also be cognizant of
other pitfalls that can accompany dress and
appearance standards. For example, dress
and appearance codes that appear neutral
on their face can lead to claims of religious
discrimination. In fact, in recent years, reli-
gious discrimination seems to be the pro-
tected class of choice for plaintiffs seeking
to have dress codes deemed unlawful. This
is not an entirely negative development for
employers, because their obligations to
accommodate religion are minimal.
In TWA v. Hardison, for instance, the
plaintiff could not work weekends because
of his religion.23 This was not a problem
until the employee transferred to a new
department. While the new position was a
step up for the employee, he became the
low employee on his new department’s
seniority chart and thus had to work
Saturdays. TWA could have accommodated
the employee by bumping him over a more
senior employee (in violation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement), having a man-
ager work the job one day per week, having
an overtime employee work the job, or run-
ning short-staffed. The airline wanted none
of those, and the court also rejected each of
these proposals because it held that an
accommodation that had anything more than
“de minimis” effect on the company was an
“undue hardship” and was not required.
This “undue hardship” standard has been
applied to dress codes, and courts have
upheld dress codes even when they do
violate the employee’s religious tenets.
In Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corp., a
cashier employed at a retail store engaged in
various forms of body modification, includ-
ing facial piercings and cuttings.24 The
employer initiated a new policy prohibiting
facial piercings (except pierced ears). The
employee did not comply with the new
policy, claiming that she was required to
wear and display facial piercings by her reli-
gion, the “Church of Body Modification.”25
After the employee was terminated for
excessive absenteeism, she filed suit, claim-
ing religious discrimination. The First
Circuit sided with the employer, held that
the employer was within its rights to estab-
lish a “no facial jewelry” policy, and held
that accommodating the plaintiff’s request
to wear facial jewelry would impose an
“undue hardship” on the employer because
it would result in the company’s losing its
ability to control how it projects its image
to the public and, further, that “the com-
pany had a legitimate interest in maintain-
ing a professional image.”
Similarly, in EEOC v. Oak-Rite Manu-
facturing Corp., the complainant, a member
of the “Conservative Holiness” faith, had
requested permission to wear a skirt while
performing her furniture manufacturing
job, claiming that her faith’s interpretation
of scripture prohibited her from wearing
trousers.26 The employer, citing safety
concerns, required her to comply with its
trousers-only dress code for all employees
working on the plant floor. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission sued
on her behalf, arguing that the employer’s
refusal to allow her to wear skirts in the
workplace amounted to religious discrimi-
nation. The district court rejected the claim,
holding that the trousers-only policy was
based on safety concerns—specifically,
concerns regarding mobility and flexibility
and the danger of loose clothing becoming
caught in machinery. Because the court
determined that the plaintiff’s request
would require the employer “to carry out
an experiment in employee safety that . . .
no other factory has tried,”27 the employer
was not required to accommodate the
employee’s request to wear skirts at work.
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In Swartzentruber v. Gunite Corp., the
district court for the Northern District of
Indiana considered the case of an employee,
a member of the “Church of American
Knights of the Ku Klux Klan” who claimed
that his employer’s requirement that he
cover up a tattoo of a hooded figure stand-
ing before a burning cross conflicted with
his religious beliefs and thereby violated
Title VII.28 (He also claimed that he was
harassed by other employees because of
his religious beliefs.) The district court
held that the employer did not discrimi-
nate against the employee on the basis of
his religion because the employee failed
to demonstrate that his religion forbade
the covering of his tattoo. Moreover, given
the inflammatory nature of the tattoo and the
possibility that it might incite workplace
violence, the court held that the employer
reasonably accommodated the employee’s
religion by allowing the employee to work,
as long as the tattoo remained covered.
Additionally, because the record showed
that the employee was harassed not because
of his religious beliefs, but because of his
“self identification as a member of the
KKK,” he could not make an actionable
case of religious harassment.29
In contrast to the Swartzentruber case,
the federal district court for the Western
District of Washington recently held that a
restaurant chain engaged in religious dis-
crimination when it terminated a server
who refused to cover up tattoos encircling
his wrists. In EEOC v. Red Robin Gourmet
Burgers, Inc., the plaintiff, a follower of
Kemeticism, a religion with roots in
ancient Egypt, claimed that it was a sin in
his religion to intentionally cover up his
wrist tattoos, which, he said, were to rep-
resent his servitude to Ra.30 Because the
plaintiff proved that he held a bona fide
religious belief, because the plaintiff’s tat-
toos were small, and because the restau-
rant had failed to prove that they tended to
deter families from visiting the restaurant,
thus posing no “hardship” to the employer,
the court concluded that management’s
refusal to accommodate the server’s reli-
gious beliefs by allowing him to work with
his wrist tattoos uncovered supported a
viable claim of religious discrimination.
Despite the Red Robin holding, it is
clear that employees have difficulty pre-
vailing in challenges to dress codes based
on religious reasons. What is unknown at
this time is how challenges to dress codes
based on other classes will be received.
For example, we do not know whether
policies such as that of the Borgata, which
require little or no weight gain, will sur-
vive the inevitable age and disability claims.
Likewise, we cannot predict whether dress
codes that prohibit certain hairstyles favored
by a particular ethnic group will survive
race and national origin claims. On one
hand, the language in Cloutier that dis-
cusses legitimate interests would lead one
to believe that these types of policy would
survive a legal challenge. Alternatively,
the de minimis standard that is at the heart
of the religious cases has not been applied
to any other protected class, and thus these
cases cannot be relied on outside the reli-
gious context.
Age, Race, the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA),
and National Origin
As we hinted in our above discussion,
in addition to sex and religion, plaintiffs
can use age, race, disability, and national
origin to argue that appearance policies
discriminate. For example, as many of us
will attest, it is difficult to maintain the
same weight as we age. Does that mean
that weight-limitation requirements will
violate the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA)? Some forms of dress
and hair styles are specific to people of
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certain races, cultures, or national origins. If
the de minimis standard does not apply to
national-origin claims, will a requirement
that prohibits, for example, men wearing
hair below their collar discriminate against
Native Americans? The ADA has been
used to force employers to relax facial hair
policies because of skin conditions, for
example, and it is possible that a thyroid
condition, diabetes, or other conditions
could be the basis of a challenge to weight
standards.
Implications for Practice
Given that the field continues to shift,
as long as employers keep a few simple
rules in mind, issues surrounding employee
behavior and appearance expectations should
be manageable. We suggest the following
principles. Do not base employment deci-
sions on gender-specific behavioral expec-
tations, and do not tolerate behavior by
one gender but not the other. Dress and
appearance codes should not overly bur-
den one gender and should be based on
reasonable business or safety considera-
tions. If an employer has requirements
regarding hair, clothing, or other aspects
of appearance, the employer should regu-
larly monitor such appearance codes for
both genders. If a company is subject to a
collective bargaining agreement, as with
all issues relating to working conditions, it
should review the contract terms to deter-
mine its bargaining obligations before
implementing any new dress or appear-
ance policies. Finally, to protect against
possible attacks on dress or appearance
codes under a religious-discrimination claim
or other similar theory, an employer
should document the business or safety
reasons for its policies.
Of course, all the possible iterations of
challenges to dress and appearance codes
have not yet made their way into the judi-
cial system. So far, the NBA’s dress code,
which requires dress slacks with jackets be
worn when players appear in public on
NBA business, is sticking. The players are,
however, part of a bargaining unit, and
efforts to enforce the policy may give rise
to a federal lawsuit or player union griev-
ances. Similarly, the Borgata Hotel Casino’s
weight policy could still incur a federal court
ruling that it is discriminatory. Finally, we
do not know whether recent court rulings
allowing disparate impact suits under the
ADEA will result in a class action brought
by individuals older than forty challenging
employer dress codes and their alleged
disparate impact on hiring and promotion
of protected class members.31 Only time
will tell.
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